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Nontechnical Summary
There is a tradition in the public finance literature claiming that higher pop-
ulation density is associated with higher public expenditures. Typically, this
literature defines crowding as the extent to which the cost of providing a certain
level of public services depends on the population size of jurisdictions. If we
consider jurisdictions of the same size in terms of area the distinction between
crowding effects from population and population density effects is not important.
This is different in a setting where jurisdictions face rather different endowments
of land and jurisdictional boundaries are fixed.
Whereas jurisdictional boundaries of municipalities in many cases are subject to
change, boundaries of subnational units such as Provinces in Canada, States in
the U.S., Cantons in Switzerland, and States (La¨nder) in Germany, are almost
completely fixed. In the German case these boundaries define drastically dif-
ferent units in terms of both population size and density. This is most obvious
from the presence of so-called “city states” – cities which experience considerable
independence in the German constitution. At the same time there exists a great
deal of fiscal redistribution within the German federation aiming at the alloca-
tion of public funds according to the fiscal needs of the states. The corresponding
fiscal equalization scheme favors in particular small and densely populated ju-
risdictions, assuming that they face higher per capita cost of providing public
goods.
Focusing on the case of Germany, this paper reconsiders the empirical relevance
of density and population size effects on the cost of providing public services.
For this purpose, it develops an approach for an empirical determination of
cost functions of public services and applies it to the German states (La¨nder),
aiming at empirical estimates of the impact of both density and population size
on the per capita cost of public services. The specific contribution of the paper
is twofold. First it explicitly distinguishes between population size and density
as determinants of the cost of public services. Second, it takes a disaggregate
approach to the public budget, estimating separate cost equations for about 40
government functions instead of dealing with the aggregate cost from the outset.
The results indicate that while there is evidence in favor of crowding effects
in population no general relationship is found between density and the cost of
public goods provided. Thus, in accordance with the literature on local pub-
lic finance, goods provided by state governments in Germany are found to be
rather quasi-private. However, our empirical results vary across functions of
government. Some public services, for instance the public provision of univer-
sity education, display a significantly positive impact of population density on
the per capita cost of provision. Other items in the public budget like general
government affairs or housing can be provided at significantly and substantially
lower per capita cost in more densely populated regions. For many functions
of government, the impact of population density on the cost of public services
proved to be insignificant. In the budget as a whole, positive and negative ef-
fects almost cancel out. Hence, a privileged treatment of highly urbanized or
sparsely populated jurisdictions in fiscal equalization systems cannot be justi-
fied by a cost disadvantage of these regions. However, with regard to population
size the results suggest that small states have some cost disadvantage. Thus,
at given state boundaries a preferential treatment of smaller states in the fiscal
equalization system seems justifiable.
To put these findings into perspective, it is important to keep in mind that the
analysis refers to the state and not to the local level. It is left for future research
to find out whether the scarcity of land at the level of municipalities may well
induce increasing cost in the provision of public goods.
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Abstract
This paper is concerned with the question as to what extent population size
and density affect the cost of providing public services at the subnational level.
Empirical estimates of cost functions are obtained from an analysis of the expen-
ditures of German states disaggregated into about 40 functions of government.
The empirical results indicate that generally there is no significant relationship
between population density and the cost of public goods. At the same time,
cost are almost proportionately related to population size indicating that goods
and services provided by the German states display only a limited degree of
publicness.
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1 Introduction
There is a tradition in public finance claiming that higher population density is
associated with higher public expenditures. This hypothesis has been put for-
ward in particular by Brecht (1932) in his empirical study of public expenditures
in Germany. However, the German literature has criticized this result because
of lacking theoretical foundation and because the empirical evidence is doubtful
(see Kuhn, 1993, for a survey). The presumption of Brecht is, however, related
to the crowding cost which are also at the center stage in the more recent theory
of local public finance (Wildasin, 1986). Typically, this literature defines crowd-
ing as the extent to which the cost of providing a certain level of public services
depends on the population size of jurisdictions. If we consider jurisdictions of
the same size in terms of area and if land available to each jurisdiction is fixed
the distinction between crowding effects from population and population density
effects is not important. This is different in a setting where jurisdictions face
rather different endowments of land and jurisdictional boundaries are fixed.
Whereas jurisdictional boundaries of municipalities in many cases are subject to
change, boundaries of subnational units such as Provinces in Canada, States in
the U.S., Cantons in Switzerland, and States (La¨nder) in Germany, are almost
completely fixed. In the German case these boundaries define drastically dif-
ferent units in terms of both population size and density. This is most obvious
from the presence of so-called “city states” – cities which experience considerable
independence in the German constitution. At the same time there exists a great
deal of fiscal redistribution within the German federation aiming at the alloca-
tion of public funds according to the fiscal needs of the states. The corresponding
fiscal equalization scheme favors in particular small and densely populated ju-
risdictions, assuming that they face higher per capita cost of providing public
goods.
Focusing on the case of Germany, this paper reconsiders the empirical relevance
of density and population size effects on the cost of providing public services. It
develops an approach for an empirical determination of cost functions of pub-
lic services and applies it to the German states (La¨nder), aiming at empirical
estimates of the impact of both density and population size on the per capita
cost of public services. The specific contribution of the paper is twofold. First
it explicitly distinguishes between population size and density as determinants
of the cost of public services. Second, it takes a disaggregate approach to the
public budget, estimating a separate cost equation for each government function
instead of dealing with the aggregate cost from the outset. This is important,
because as emphasized by Oates (1988) the bundle of public services provided
by jurisdictions will tend to differ between jurisdictions of different size.
The focus of the empirical analysis is on the state level, ignoring municipal ex-
penditures. This choice of topic is motivated by the quantitative importance of
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the states which accounted for 34.4% of non-social security public spending in
1998. Moreover, there is a fierce political debate on transfers between the Ger-
man states, and in particular on the treatment of densely and sparsely populated
states in the fiscal equalization scheme.1
The results indicate that while there is evidence in favor of crowding effects
in population no general relationship is found between density and the cost of
public goods provided. Thus, in accordance with the literature on local pub-
lic finance, goods provided by state governments in Germany are found to be
rather quasi-private. This conforms with Litvack and Oates (1970) who argue
with regard to the U.S. states that government spending varies inversely with
the size of the population while spending by local governments is positively and
significantly related to the concentration of population as measured by the de-
gree of urbanization. However, our empirical results vary across functions of
government. Some public services, for instance the public provision of univer-
sity education, display a significantly positive impact of population density on
the per capita cost of provision. Other items in the public budget like general
government affairs or housing can be provided at significantly and substantially
lower per capita cost in more densely populated regions. For many functions
of government, the impact of population density on the cost of public services
proved to be insignificant. In the budget as a whole, positive and negative effects
almost cancel out. Hence, a privileged treatment of densely populated jurisdic-
tions in fiscal equalization systems cannot be justified by a cost disadvantage of
these regions. But, abstracting of their possible disincentive effects differences
in the population size of states may justify extended transfers to smaller states.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses some
theoretical and methodological issues involved. Section 3 discusses the investi-
gation approach and the data in more detail. Section 4 presents the empirical
results. Section 5 gives a short conclusion.
2 Theoretical and Methodological Issues
The provision of local public services qi in state i is assumed to be determined
by the level of public spending Gi, by the size of the population Ni, and by
population density di, formally
qi = q (Gi, Ni, di)
1The Federal Constitutional Court ruled on November 11, 1999 that the impact of agglomeration on ex-
penditure needs should be examined before a reform of the transfer system is conceived (BVerfG, 2 BvF 2/98,
319).
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where the partial derivatives are
qG > 0, qN ≤ 0.
In case of pure public goods qN = 0. The effect of population density on the
supply of local public services qd rests uncertain. The German fiscal equalization
system assumes that both densely and sparsely populated regions face higher per
capita cost of providing public goods. The supply function can be used to derive
an expenditure function
Gi = G (qi, Ni, di) where Gq > 0, GN ≥ 0,
and in terms of per capita expenditures gi = Gi/Ni
gi = g (qi, Ni, di) where gq > 0, gN = [GN − (Gi/Ni)]/Ni. (1)
In case of pure public goods gN < 0 since GN = 0. Equation (1) suggests to
verify empirically the impact of population size and agglomeration on the cost of
public services by relating per capita expenditures to measures of population size
and density. This approach, however, has to face two methodological problems,
related to the budget identity and to the difficulty to observe the supply of public
services.
Due to the budget identity a regression of expenditures on indicators of ag-
glomeration and size might reflect the impact of the local conditions on revenue
rather than on cost. Since urbanized regions typically have a higher per capita
GDP it is quite plausible that more densely populated states will gather higher
per capita tax revenues and, correspondingly, will disburse higher expenditures
than rural states. However, it would be misleading to interpret this result as a
confirmation of higher cost (e.g., Hansmeyer, 1980, and Oates, 1988).
In the German case, matters are slightly different due to the system of inter-
governmental transfers between the states (La¨nderfinanzausgleich). This system
is characterized by a differential treatment of city states compared to non-city
states. The per capita revenues of the non-city states are more or less equalized
by taxing (subsidizing) their own tax revenues at marginal rates going up to
92% (Lichtblau, 1999). On the other hand, 35% higher than average per capita
revenues are accorded to the three city states Hamburg, Bremen, and Berlin. It
is thus no surprise if the city states were found to spend roughly 35% more per
capita than the other states. In a simple comparison of expenditures between
these two groups, the higher density of the city states would seem to imply
higher cost per capita, whereas the comparison might simply reveal the special
treatment in the fiscal equalization scheme. The present analysis ignores the
city states because they do not have separate budgets for the state and the mu-
nicipal level. The problem caused by the budget identity is however not solved
by excluding the city states. Rather, it reappears with the sign reversed. Since
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now all states in the sample get more or less the same revenues after equaliza-
tion (Sachversta¨ndigenrat, 2001) one might find no impact of agglomeration on
expenditure even if there is an effect on cost.
Wrong conclusions like this arise because the naive approach does not distinguish
observed expenditures from the cost of providing a given level of public goods.
To illustrate this, consider two states, a densely populated one, and a rural
one, and assume that the more urbanized state displays higher expenditures per
capita. This may well be due to the fact that it is more expensive to provide a
given level of public goods in agglomerated regions. It may however just as well
reflect more or better services provided by the urbanized state out of its higher
revenues or due to different preferences of the residents.2 Similarly, it may also
be that the state with the higher degree of agglomeration allows more slack in
its production of public goods, e.g., by overstaffing the administration. Only the
first explanation would qualify as a cost disadvantage of agglomerations. Thus,
to identify the cost impact of agglomeration, one should control for differences
in the level of public services provided.
Typically, the level of public services cannot be observed directly. This is due to
the very nature of public goods: they are not traded on a market. The quality of
a unit of a private firm’s product is readily measured by the price at which it sells,
since it reflects the corresponding marginal willingness to pay. For public goods,
the marginal willingness to pay is unknown since nobody has to pay for them,
directly. Notice that this is not only true for genuinely non-excludable goods. It
also holds for those goods which are provided for free by the state although it
would in principle be possible to levy a positive price. As a consequence, there
is no ready quantification of public service provision. One possible remedy is to
approximate the level of public goods supplied using indicators (e.g., Brueckner,
1981, Loehman and Emerson, 1985, Craig and Heikkila, 1989, or Castells and
Sole´ Olle´, 2000). These indicators will sometimes capture the sheer quantity of
public services provided, for instance by the intensity of utilization of a public
service. But, utilization indicators will fail to express quality, which certainly
is an important dimension of public services. The number of students indicates
the quantity of the output of a school, but it is generally agreed that there
are wide differences in the quality of education. However, appropriate data are
unfortunately not always available in sufficient regional detail. Moreover, there
are many other public functions such as the general administration where a
suitable testing would be difficult to devise. An alternative option is to assume
that the supply of public services follows the demand for public services and to
explicitly introduce its determinants (e.g., Borcherding and Deacon, 1972).
As a feasible solution, different types of indicators are used in the following
2Oates (1988) emphasizes this point with respect to the cost of local public goods. He argues that these cost
are likely to be overestimated for large cities because large cities tend to provide more and better services than
smaller municipalities.
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depending on the specific function of government considered. For some functions
of government, as for instance police protection, the level of services provided can
be operationalized by measuring the level of security by means of the crime rate.
Assuming that the level of services provided is positively affected by the quantity
of factors used in the production of the public good, other indicators capture the
employed inputs. For example, the quality of education presumably improves if
there are more teachers, the quality of transportation improves if there are more
roads, and public security improves if the number of police officers increases. Of
course, more inputs need not necessarily indicate a higher value of services, as
more inputs can simply mean more waste. However, one may also argue that
it is necessary to use more inputs in an urbanized area in order to provide the
same quantity and quality of the public good. This amounts to saying that
public sector cost are not only higher in agglomerations because input prices
are higher, but that in addition the production technology is different. While
this is a theoretical possibility, given data limitations it is impossible to separate
empirically such an effect from the other causes for an increased use of inputs. In
particular, the distinction between a necessary, agglomeration-related increase
in the demand for inputs, and inefficient production seems impossible to draw
empirically. However, while indicators can only imperfectly measure the level of
public services, this imperfection is mitigated in the empirical application by a
disaggregate approach which employs indicators specific to each of the various
functions of government. This approach allows to describe the entire budget
without having to impose an arbitrary aggregation of indicators.
3 Investigation Approach
Following the preceding discussion, the empirical approach distinguishes four
basic determinants of per capita expenditures:
i.) state population size,
ii.) population density,
iii.) per capita level of service provided, and
iv.) unobserved characteristics.
Note that the population of the state is distinguished from population density.
This allows to capture the presence of economies of scale in the provision of
at least partly non-rival public goods independently of the issue of how strong
citizens are concentrated in space. This is in accordance with the local public
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finance literature on congestion3 which emphasizes that the per capita cost of
public goods provision will generally decline with the number of residents if one
holds constant the level of public services provided, as long as public goods are
not completely rival in consumption. The last item in the list of determinants
refers to specific cost enhancing factors, such as the reconstruction of public
infrastructure in East Germany. Since the expenditure structure of the East
German states, especially at the beginning of the period of observation, is barely
comparable to that of the West German states, the regression employs time-
specific coefficients for the former. Finally, time-specific constants are used in
order to catch overall trends in the expenditures of all states, e.g. due to federal
wage agreements in the public sector.
With regard to functional forms the literature often assumes that per capita ex-
penditure is a loglinear function of population size. However, in order to properly
deal with the differences in the size of jurisdictions such a specification is much
too restrictive because it implies that the degree of publicness of public services
is constant even if jurisdictions show strong differences in population size. In-
stead, it seems more reasonabe to employ some nonlinear specification. Facing
a setting with a very small number of observations we employ the following
separable functional form
EXPit = β0t + β1
(
1
POPit
)
+ β2DENSit + β3SERVit + β4tEASTi + uit,
such that population size (POPit) is accounted for using a standard cost degres-
sion effect. For a given land area, an increase in population affects per capita
cost in two ways, quantified by the coefficients β1 and β2. First, the fixed cost
are shared by more inhabitants, and, second, there may be higher or lower cost
because of higher density (DENSit). The proposed specification allows for a
separation of these two effects.
Since the level of public goods supply (iii) and the unobserved cost component
(iv) may differ for government functions as well as for states, the quantitative
analysis will be carried out for the single functions separately. This yields a sep-
arate regression for each state government function k = 1, ..., n with a function
specific indicator for the level of services provided SERV [k]it. It provides an
estimate of the impact β [k]1 of population size and β [k]2 of population den-
sity on the per capita expenditures EXP [k]it for this function. In a second
step, then, the elasticities of per capita expenditures with respect to population
3For a survey, see Reiter and Weichenrieder (1997).
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size and population density are calculated for each government function.4 The
specific elasticities are finally aggregated across functions in order to assess the
respective effects on the total state budget. For this purpose, a weighted aver-
age is computed using the expenditure shares in the states’ budgets as weights
resulting in a measure of the aggregate effects.
The basic dataset provides information on a large number of spending categories.
In the analysis minor spending categories are excluded where not all states report
positive expenditures. In addition, categories are neglected which could not be
clearly assigned to specific public services or to a specific period. Out of the total
number of 70 spending categories5 the analysis focuses on nearly 40 categories,
which together represent 75-80% of the total direct state expenditures.6 As the
focus is on the state level, the three city states Hamburg, Bremen and Berlin are
neglected, where the finances of the respective municipalities are merged with
those of the state, and the analysis focuses on 13 states. In order to remove the
specific development in the New La¨nder and other periodical fluctuations, the
analysis uses repeated cross-sections over 6 years, 1992-1997. The data are used
in per capita terms and in constant prices of 1995.
As a measure of the degree of agglomeration, population density is used, defined
by the ratio of a state’s population over the area claimed for settlement and
transportation purposes (Siedlungsdichte). This indicator is quite independent
of the administrative territorial organization and appears to be more reasonable
than raw population density, since the citizens as beneficiaries of public goods
concentrate on the area used for settlement and transportation. However, about
93% of cross-sectional variation in population density is explained by this mea-
sure of density in the settlement area. Table 1 shows the statistics on population,
population density and per capita expenditure for the German states.
4Relying on the per capita expenditure equation the elasticity of public expenditures with respect to population
size, the degree of “publicness” α [k] of the public service k, is defined as
α [k] ≡ 1− gN [k] N
g [k]
.
Using the above non-linear specification,
α [k] = 1− β [k]1
EXP [k]POP
,
where EXP [k] and POP [k] are average figures. The elasticity with respect to density is computed from
γ [k] = gd [k]
d
g [k]
= β [k]2
DENS
EXP [k]
.
5Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 14 (Finanzen und Steuern), Reihe 3.1 Rechnungsergebnisse des
o¨ffentlichen Gesamthaushalts.
6Direct expenditures are analyzed, reporting expenditures taken by the state government itself, thus excluding
intergovernmental transfers between the different levels of government.
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Table 1: Population, population density, and per capita expenditure of the Ger-
man La¨nder, 1997
State Population Pop. per Pop. per Expenditure
total area settlement area per capita
Schleswig-Holstein 2750 0.174 1.618 4.217
Hamburga 1707 2.261 3.998 11.800
Lower Saxony 7831 0.164 1.354 3.996
Bremena 676 1.673 3.101 13.162
Nordrhine-Westphalia 17963 0.527 2.601 3.707
Hesse 6031 0.286 1.966 4.003
Rhineland-Palatinate 4010 0.202 1.556 4.348
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 10387 0.291 2.286 3.972
Bavaria 12056 0.171 1.740 3.895
Saarland 1083 0.421 2.183 5.139
Berlina 3445 3.866 5.800 13.309
Brandenburg 2563 0.087 1.124 5.285
Meckl.-Westpommerania 1814 0.078 1.259 5.369
Saxony 4536 0.246 2.323 4.404
Anhalt-Saxony 2714 0.133 1.533 5.400
Thuringia 2485 0.154 1.820 5.394
Mean 5128 0.671 2.266 6.088
Mean (excl. City st.) 5863 0.226 1.797 4.548
Mean East Germany 2822 0.140 1.612 5.171
Note: Yearly average population in 1000; population density in 1000 inhabitants per square kilometre regarding
the entire state surface, and, alternatively, regarding the area claimed for settlement and transportation purposes;
state government direct expenditures per capita in 1000 DM; a including state and local government. Source:
Statistisches Bundesamt, own calculations.
As far as possible, suitable indicators for the level of public supply are associated
specifically to the different functions. But, as outlined above, there are serious
problems due to the lack of adequate data and different types of indicators are
chosen for this study. For some functions of government reasonable proxies for
the level of services provided are available, as for instance the crime rate as a
proxy of the level of security. For other functions of government, the analysis
proceeds by assuming that the level of public supply varies proportionally with
the observable quantitative indicators of public activity, such as the personnel
employed in different functions. In the area of education this can be the num-
ber of teachers per inhabitant, in the area of justice the number of judges per
inhabitant. The number of public institutions can be used alternatively, too,
such as universities or prisons. Finally, assuming that the level of public ser-
8
vices provided is proportional to the respective demand, demand indicators are
employed, such as the number of students.7
4 Results
The empirical analysis is concerned with the effects of population size and ag-
glomeration on the per capita expenditures of the German La¨nder governments
for individual functions of governments. The first aspect accounts for economies
of scale and the degree of “publicness” of publicly provided goods as described in
the literature on local public finance. The second aspect investigates the role of
the spatial distribution of the population for the cost of providing public goods.
For each function of government the analysis proceeds as follows. First, other
potential determinants of per capita expenditures besides population density and
population size, such as indicators for the level of public services are included.
Because of the small number of observations, indicators are dropped if they do
not contribute to the goodness of fit. Then, function specific elasticities of public
expenditures are calculated using the average state expenditures of 1997 and the
estimated coefficients for both the population size and the population density
effect. The results of the estimates (Table 2) together with the elasticities (Table
3) are listed below.8
According to the coefficient of determination (not shown) agglomeration together
with population size and the indicators of the level of public services explain in
most cases nearly half of the interstate variation in per capita spending. The
employed indicators generally show the expected expenditure enhancing effects.
Across functions of governments, however, agglomeration and population size
show different effects.
A positive significant impact of population density on public spending is only
found for some important areas, such as universities, support of education, other
social affairs, and food and agriculture. Note that in the German federation
expenditures on universities are fully assigned to the state governments and
represent an important expenditure category. According to the results for the
elasticities, a doubling of population density increases expenditures for univer-
sities by 27.8%. The effects of an increase in population density amount to 45%
in the case of other social affairs which contain especially labor market policy
and respectively 35.7% for food and agriculture.
In contrast, in several areas a negative significant effect of population density
is found, which indicates that stronger agglomeration causes cost advantages
7See Table 4 for an overview of the function specific indicators for the level of public supply employed.
8The estimated coefficients of the indicators are available upon request.
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in the provision of public goods. For instance, this is the case with general
government affairs, ordinary and other courts, other cultural affairs apart from
theatre and music, and housing. Public spending on general government affairs
is lower by 62.5% if density doubles. The reductions in the fields of ordinary
and other courts are comparatively less pronounced with 6.4%, and, respectively,
18.3%. The strong negative effect in the field of housing (110.6%), also mainly
a function of the state government, indicates density advantages, too. Finally,
however, many important areas do not show significant density effects.
With regard to the degree of “publicness”, the estimates support mainly elastic-
ities of expenditures with respect to population size around unity. Accordingly,
per capita expenditures are almost constant in the size of the population, in-
dicating that most of the goods provided by the state governments tend to be
quasi-private goods. Certain cost degression effects and elasticities significantly
smaller than unity are especially found for public spending on other administra-
tion, general government, theatre and music, social welfare, other health affairs,
and regional development. In most cases, however, the hypothesis of an elasticity
equal to unity cannot be rejected, as for example in the case of general education
and vocational schools, other social affairs, other family benefits, housing, food
and agriculture, and railways and public transport.
The elasticities of expenditures with regard to population size and population
density for single government functions are finally weighted with budgetary
shares and added in order to illustrate the implications for the overall state
budget.9 The aggregate effects indicate as to which extent an increment in
population size or density increases or lowers the state per capita expenditures
on aggregate. Despite of the exclusion of certain functions of government, this
overall figure can be considered as representative for about four fifth of the state
government expenditure. The last two lines in Table 3 present the results.
Accordingly, due to the systematic effect of an increment of population density by
100% a state government spends about 5.7% less if the budgetary structure over
all states is taken for reference. However, this effect is not significant. Hence,
the hypothesis that state expenditures are independent of population density
cannot be rejected. With regard to the degree of “publicness”, the aggregate
elasticity is slightly below unity at the 1% level of significance. This indicates
that public services provided by the states do show some degree of publicness.
Yet, the degree of publicness is rather small. Accordingly, large states have some
minor cost advantages in the provision of public services as compared to small
states. As the expenditure structure of the East German states is still biased
by the process of transition, it appears reasonable to apply not only the average
budgetary shares of all German states, but alternatively, the budgetary structure
9The budget share is defined as the expenditure share of a government function in total expenditures considered
in the estimations. The elasticities are related to the expenditure figures of 1997. Therefore the single functions
are weighted by this year’s average expenditure shares, as well.
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of the former West German states. However, this does not show a significant
effect on the result.
Since some part of the state government functions is probably carried out by
local governments, which are reimbursed with specific vertical grants, it seems
possible that the influence of population size and agglomeration is stronger if
a more comprehensive concept of expenditures is used, which includes transfers
to lower level governments. More specifically, the alternative concept measures
the impact on expenditures inclusive of intergovernmental expenditures but ex-
clusive of intergovernmental revenues. Therefore, sensitivity analyses have been
carried out for this alternative expenditure concept, the results, however, being
in general very similar.10
In order to deal with the problem of pooling data of heterogeneous states, a
random-effects estimation has been carried out, too. Hausman tests indicated
that the unobserved characteristics of the states are correlated with the em-
ployed indicators. Alternatively, the fixed-effects method is not convincing in
the present case, since invariable characteristics are excluded from the estima-
tion, whereas population density and size is barely changing in the course of
time. This is also made clear by a cross-sectional (between groups) estimation
with mean values for the single states over the six years, which yields quite
identical results (available upon request). But, in comparison to the standard
regression, the between groups regression has the disadvantage of not capturing
the process of adjustment in East Germany and the variation in agglomeration.
Even if unobserved heterogeneity in the estimation cannot be tackled directly due
to the restrictions of the analysis, it is however possible to robustify inference.
For that purpose, the regressions have been run using standard errors according
to White (1980). In all cases the confidence intervals appear to be smaller than
in the standard estimation. Therefore, the results of the standard estimation can
be considered as conservative estimates. Even if the heteroscedasticity-consistent
estimation might be superior to the standard estimation from a theoretical point
of view, preference is given to the latter in the present case because of the limited
number of observations.11
5 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the impact of both population size and population
density on the per capita cost of public goods provided by the German states. For
this purpose, a framework of per capita expenditures was presented featuring the
10The results of the different sensitivity analyses are available upon request.
11According to Davidson and MacKinnon (1993), the reliability of the heteroscedasticity-consistent matrix of
covariance is questionable in the case of small samples, see ibd., p.553.
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degree of agglomeration and the size of population as main explanatory variables.
The approach suggested takes account of the level of public services provided,
as well as of trends and of specific conditions in East Germany. This model
was estimated separately for about 40 government functions. While the results
differ across functions, the aggregated effect of agglomeration on the budget
is insignificant. This implies that, in the aggregate, per capita cost of public
services are constant, i.e. there is no cost disadvantage for highly urbanized nor
for sparsely populated regions. Hence a preferential treatment of such states
in fiscal equalization schemes as in Germany cannot be justified by referring to
the cost of providing public goods. However, with regard to population size the
results suggest that small states have some cost disadvantage. A state with half
the average size of 5.9 million inhabitants will have about 4 % higher cost than
the average state. Thus, at given state boundaries a preferential treatment of
smaller states in the fiscal equalization system seems justifiable. Of course, from
an efficiency point of view an alternative option is to rearrange state boundaries.
To put these findings into perspective, it is important to keep in mind that
the analysis refers to the state and not to the local level. Now, if states in
Germany follow the advice of the classical writers in fiscal federalism such as
Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972), they provide public goods whose benefits
exert significant effects across their whole territory, irrespective of the place
where they are provided. Thus, it is not too surprising that local conditions like
population density are found not to affect the overall cost of public services at
the state level. Consequently, one should be careful when applying the current
results to the level of municipalities. There, the scarcity of land may well induce
increasing cost in the provision of public goods. It is left for future research to
find out whether this is indeed the case. The approach taken in this paper could
prove useful in such an exercise as well.
References
Borcherding, T. E. and R. T. Deacon (1972), The demand for the services of non-federal
governments, American Economic Review 62, 891–901.
Brecht, A. (1932), Internationaler Vergleich o¨ffentlicher Ausgaben, Grundfragen der inter-
nationalen Politik 2, Leipzig.
Brueckner, J. K. (1981), Congested public goods: The case of fire protection, Journal of
Public Economics 15, 45–58.
Bundeskriminalamt, Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik, 1993-1998.
Castells Oliveres, A. and A. Sole´ Olle´ (2000), Estimacio´n de las necessidades de gasto
de las Communidades Auto´nomas: Metodolog´ıa y applicacio´n pra´ctica, Departament
d’Hisenda Publica, Universitat de Barcelona.
12
Craig, S. G. and E. J.Heikkila (1989), Urban safety in Vancouver: allocation and production
of a congestible public good, Canadian Journal of Economics 22, 867–884.
Davidson, R. and J. J. MacKinnon (1993), Estimation and inference in economics, New
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Federal Constitutional Court (1999), BVerfG, 2 BvF 2/98 vom 11.11.1999,
http://www.bverfg.de
Hansmeyer, K.-H. (1980), Der kommunale Finanzausgleich als Instrument zur Fo¨rderung
Zentraler Orte, in: Pohmer, D. (ed.), Probleme des Finanzausgleichs II, Berlin: Duncker
und Humboldt, p. 83ff.
Kuhn, T. (1993), Determinanten der Staatsausgaben: Bevo¨lkerung und Urbanisierung, Eine
Literaturu¨bersicht, Ifo Studien – Zeitschrift fu¨r empirische Wirtschaftsforschung 39. Jg.
/ 1-4, 127–145.
Lichtblau, K. (1999), Finanzausgleich: Reformoptionen und ein konkreter Vorschlag, in:
Morath, K. (ed.): Reform des Fo¨deralismus, Bad Homburg: Frankfurter Institut - Stiftung
Marktwirtschaft und Politik, 95–115.
Litvack, J. M. and W. E. Oates (1970), Group size and the output of public goods: Theory
and an application to state-local finance in the United States, Public Finance 25, 42–62.
Loehman, E. and R. Emerson (1985), A simultaneous equation model of local government
expenditure decisions, Land Economics 61, 419–431.
Musgrave, R. A. (1959), A theory of public finance: A study in public economy, New York:
McGraw-Hill.
Oates, W. E. (1972), Fiscal federalism, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Oates, W. E. (1988), On the measurement of congestion in the provision of local public goods,
Journal of Urban Economics 24, 85–94.
Reiter, M. and A. Weichenrieder (1997), Are public goods public? A critical survey of
demand estimates for local public services, Finanzarchiv N.F. 54, 374–408.
Sachversta¨ndigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwick-
lung (2001), Fu¨r Stetigkeit – Gegen Aktionismus, Jahersgutachten 2001/2002, Wies-
baden.
Statistisches Bundesamt (SBA), Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1992-1999, Wiesbaden.
Statistisches Bundesamt (SBA), Bildung im Zahlenspiegel, 1996-1999, Wiesbaden.
Statistisches Bundesamt (SBA) (1995), Finanzen und Steuern, Fachserie 14 / 7.1, Wies-
baden.
Statistisches Bundesamt (SBA) (1997), Fachserie 10 / R1, Wiesbaden.
Statistisches Bundesamt (SBA) (2000), Bevo¨lkerungsstruktur und Wirtschaftskraft der
Bundesla¨nder, Wiesbaden.
Wildasin, D. (1986), Urban public finance, Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers.
White, H. (1980), A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct
test for heteroscedasticity, Econometrica 48, 817–838.
13
Table 2: Estimates for direct expenditures, by government function
Function Exp. per Pop. density 1/Population Indi-
capita cator
Other administration 14.1 0.001 (0.001) 0.024 ??? (0.002) no
General government 108.3 -0.037??? (0.006) 0.148 ??? (0.011) no
Internal admin. 35.0 0.007 (0.007) -0.010 (0.015) yes
Building admin. 29.0 -0.017??? (0.004) -0.002 (0.007) no
Tax, financial admin. 121.8 0.004 (0.003) 0.029 ??? (0.009) yes
External affairs 1.1 -0.000 (0.000) -0.001 ?? (0.001) no
Other publ. security 8.6 -0.005??? (0.001) 0.002 (0.002) no
Police 228.7 -0.007 (0.006) 0.019 ? (0.010) yes
Other courts 17.7 -0.002 ?? (0.001) -0.002 (0.002) yes
Ordinary courts, attorneys 138.3 -0.005 ?? (0.002) -0.013??? (0.004) yes
Prisons 40.8 0.000 (0.003) 0.012 ??? (0.005) yes
Gen. education schools 652.3 -0.048 (0.048) -0.034 (0.086) yes
Vocational schools 175.4 0.059 (0.049) 0.063 (0.095) yes
Universities 588.3 0.090 ?? (0.045) 0.183 ?? (0.079) yes
Support of education 39.0 0.013 ??? (0.002) -0.009 ?? (0.004) no
Other education 24.6 -0.001 (0.003) 0.002 (0.006) yes
Extra-univ. science 69.6 -0.004 (0.005) -0.017 ? (0.010) no
Other cultural affairs 50.6 -0.017??? (0.005) -0.006 (0.010) no
Theatre, music 20.8 -0.001 (0.006) 0.018 ?? (0.008) yes
Other social affairs 117.6 0.029 ??? (0.009) -0.007 (0.020) yes
Other familiy benefits 105.0 0.003 (0.012) 0.021 (0.024) yes
Social welfare 67.2 -0.003 (0.021) 0.319 ??? (0.048) yes
Youth welfare 18.9 -0.004 (0.007) -0.013 (0.019) yes
War effects 26.6 -0.004 (0.007) -0.012 (0.013) no
Other health affairs 15.0 0.001 (0.002) 0.020 ??? (0.004) no
Hospitals 89.8 -0.016 (0.010) 0.010 (0.020) yes
Sports, recreation 8.2 0.001 (0.001) -0.004 ?? (0.002) yes
Environm. protection 29.0 -0.010 ? (0.006) -0.017 (0.011) no
Housing 157.6 -0.096??? (0.022) 0.005 (0.043) no
Area planning, etc. 24.9 -0.014??? (0.002) 0.006 (0.005) no
Food, agriculture 123.9 0.024 ? (0.015) -0.005 (0.018) yes
Other manufact., services 36.2 -0.007 ?? (0.004) 0.002 (0.007) no
Energy and water supply 25.7 -0.017 ?? (0.007) -0.005 (0.013) no
Regional development 151.7 0.002 (0.013) 0.100 ??? (0.025) no
Roads (incl. admin.) 48.9 -0.012 (0.009) 0.017 (0.017) yes
Railways, publ. transp. 157.6 -0.020 (0.013) 0.033 (0.025) no
Agricultural enterprises 44.4 -0.000 (0.010) 0.006 (0.009) yes
Total (all states) 3612.2
Total (West German states) 3041.6
Note: Average direct per capita expenditure (in DM) of the 13 non-city states in 1997. Standard errors are in
brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3: Elasticities, by government function, 1997
Function Pop. density Population
Other administration 0.135 (0.154) 0.707??? (0.038)
General government -0.625??? (0.098) 0.764??? (0.021)
Internal admin. 0.389 (0.372) 1.052 (0.074)
Building admin. -1.059??? (0.261) 1.014 (0.041)
Tax, financial admin. 0.060 (0.039) 0.959??? (0.013)
External affairs -0.022 (0.565) 1.204 ? (0.123)
Other publ. security -0.986??? (0.273) 0.968 (0.044)
Police -0.059 (0.048) 0.986 ? (0.007)
Other courts -0.183 ?? (0.083) 1.024 (0.019)
Ordinary courts, attorneys -0.064 ?? (0.026) 1.017??? (0.005)
Prisons 0.008 (0.136) 0.947??? (0.019)
Gen. education schools -0.134 (0.135) 1.009 (0.023)
Vocational schools 0.617 (0.542) 0.938 (0.095)
Universities 0.278 ?? (0.139) 0.946 ?? (0.023)
Support of education 0.617??? (0.109) 1.042 ?? (0.019)
Other education -0.092 (0.246) 0.984 (0.044)
Extra-univ. science -0.115 (0.132) 1.043 ? (0.024)
Other cultural affairs -0.620??? (0.204) 1.021 (0.035)
Theatre, music -0.115 (0.490) 0.851 ?? (0.071)
Other social affairs 0.450??? (0.147) 1.010 (0.030)
Other familiy benefits 0.051 (0.212) 0.965 (0.040)
Social welfare -0.094 (0.570) 0.180??? (0.295)
Youth welfare -0.361 (0.707) 1.123 (0.181)
War effects -0.270 (0.477) 1.081 (0.089)
Other health affairs 0.149 (0.268) 0.771??? (0.060)
Hospitals -0.321 (0.212) 0.980 (0.039)
Sports, recreation 0.239 (0.280) 1.091 ?? (0.044)
Environm. protection -0.611 (0.392) 1.102 (0.071)
Housing -1.106??? (0.308) 0.995 (0.048)
Area planning, etc. -1.036??? (0.206) 0.960 (0.033)
Food, agriculture 0.357 ? (0.216) 1.007 (0.025)
Other manufact., services -0.375 ?? (0.181) 0.990 (0.032)
Energy and water supply -1.216 ?? (0.597) 1.034 (0.090)
Regional development 0.027 (0.157) 0.886??? (0.031)
Roads (incl. admin.) -0.450 (0.359) 0.940 (0.061)
Railways, publ. transp. -0.229 (0.148) 0.964 (0.027)
Agricultural enterprises -0.012 (0.417) 0.975 (0.036)
Total (all states) -0.057 (0.050) 0.958??? (0.010)
Total (West German states) -0.039 (0.050) 0.960??? (0.010)
Note: Standard errors are in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively,
as derived from the Wald test for joint significance. In case of population the test is carried out for the hypothesis
that the elasticity is equal to unity.
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Table 4: Government functions and indicators of public activity
Code Function Indicator
1002a Other administration –
1003 General government –
1004 Internal admin. Government districts (p. inh.)
1005 Building admin. –
1006 Tax, financial admin. Income tax-payers (p. inh.)
1007 External affairs –
1010a Other publ. security –
1011 Police Recorded crimes (p. inh.)
1012a Other courts Judges at other courts (p. inh.)
1013 Ordin. courts, attorneys Judges at ordinary courts (p. inh.)
1014 Prisons Prisoners (p. prison); Prisons (p. inh.)
1017a Gen. education schools Pupils at general schools (p. inh.)
1018a Vocational schools Teachers at vocat. schools (p. inh.)
1019 Universities Scientific staff (p. inh.); Universities (p. inh.)
1020 Support of education –
1021 Other education Further educat. colleges (p. inh.)
1022 Extra-univ. science –
1023a Other cultural affairs –
1024 Theatre, music Visitors of public theatres (p. inh.)
1025a Other social affairs Unemployed persons (p. inh.)
1028a Other familiy benefits Housing benefit receivers (p. inh.)
1029 Social welfare Social benefits receivers (p. inh.)
1030 Youth welfare Young people receiving educ. assist. (p. inh.)
1031 War effects –
1032a Other health affairs –
1033 Hospitals Public hospitals (p. inh.)
1034 Sports, recreation Recreation area in km2 (p. inh.)
1035 Environm. protection –
1037 Housing –
1038 Area planning, etc. –
1045 Food, agriculture Agric. area (p. inh.); Empl. in agric. (p. inh.)
1046a Other manuf., services –
1047 Energy, water supply –
1049 Regional development –
1051a Roads (incl. admin.) Licensed vehicles (p. inh.)
1057 Railways, publ. transp. –
1059 Agricult. enterprises Agric. area in km2 (p. inh.)
Four-digit code according to the fiscal statistics. a indicates residual categories. Source: except for crime data,
which are obtained from the Federal Police Office, all data are obtained from the German Statistical Office,
various publications.
16
